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Section 3(a) of tne Small Business Act, as amended,
authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to enter into
contracts with other government procuring agencies for goods and
services. The SBA subcontracts the work on a sole source basis
to small businesses that are owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals. Overpricing of 8(a)
contracts occurs when an award is made above the current fair
market value and the SBA does not provide business development
expense funds for the price differential. Both General
Accounting Office and United States Armiy Audit Agency audits cite
cases of overpricing. This thesis examines overpricing from a
total change order rate perspective for 8(a) and formally
advertised maintenance service. From the data accumulated for
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I. IMRQDUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Section 8(a) of tne Small Business Act, as aniended,
authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to serve as
prime contractor and enter into contracts with federal government
procuring agencies to furnish articles, equipment, supplies or
materials to the federal government. The SBA then subcontracts
the actual performance of the work, on a sole source basis, to
small businesses that are ov/ned and controlled by socially and
economically disaavantaged individuals. As stated in the Federal
Register ;
The purpose of tne Section 8(a) Program is to:
(i) Foster business ownership by individuals who are both
socially and economically disadvantaged; (ii) promote the
competitive viaoility of such firms by providing such available
contract, financial, technical and management assistance as may
be necessary; and (iii) clarify and expand the program for the
procurement by the United States of articles, equipment,
supplies, services, materials and construction work from small
business concerns owned by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals. [Ref. l:p. 56690]
Contracts awarded under the 8(a) Program utilize
sole source negotiations with economically disadvantaged
contractors. The use of sole source negotiations precludes
competition from being a factor in price determination,
while the economically disadvantaged contractors typically
lack contract experience. This combination of no
cor.ipet i t ion and an inexper iencea contractor can result in a
contract price which is higher than a price that woula be
obtained under normal competitive conditions.
Contracting procedures for 8(a) contracts require tne
procuring agency to determine the fair market value, whicn
is the price that would be obtained under normal competitive
conditions. However, overpricing occurs when these contracts are
awarded above the fair market value and SBA does not provide
business development expense funds for the differential.
Overpricing can and does occur. This fact is supported by
audits conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the
United States Army Audit Agency. The audits cited difficulty in
determining the fair market value, opposing objectives for the
negotiators, and non use of business development expense funds as
factors leading to overpricing situations.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to review potential
overpricing of 8(a) contracts from a total change order cost
perspective. This perspective will take into account the tvjo
different contract processes for 8(a) and formally advertised
contracts
.
The combination of Graham-Rudman budget cuts and Department
of Defense (DOD) emphasis on competitive procurement call for a
further review of the cost to federal government agencies
participating in the 8(a) Program. If overpricing exists in 8(a)
awarded contracts, the matter must be reviewed and corrective
7
acuion taken to ensure that the neeaea service is receivea at the
minirauiri cost.
Despite the audit finding of overpricing, one might argue
that tne determination of overpricing between 8(a) versus
formally aavertised contracts can be difficult. The difficulty
occurs because contract specifications and requirements aiffer as
well as tne award processes.
Contracts awarded under tne 8(a) Program utilize sole source
negotiations with economically disadvantaged contractors. Sole
source negotiations permit the contract parties to discuss and
resolve contract problems prior to contract award, the end result
being a better mutual understanding of the contract requirements
and costs. This should also result in a better understanding of
contract requirements when the price is established and,
consequently, n.inimal change orders to correct specification
errors/omissions during the contract period. The initial
contract price should then be a good representation of the total
contract price.
Formally advertised contracts do not permit the contract
parties to discuss and resolve contract problems prior to award.
Contractor competition establishes the contract price. Change
orders are then used to resolve specification errors/omissions
during tne contract period. This implies that the initial




formally acvertisea contracts are more likely
to experience lower award amounts and a potential for high cnange
order costs, while 8(a) awaras are more likely to experience a
higner award amount and minimal change orders. Therefore,
comparing, award prices, as the GAO and Army audits did, may not
give a fair representation of the overpricing phenomenon.
An analysis of total change order costs for the two types of
contracts should neutralize the different effects associated with
tne different contract processes. This neutralization should
permit a better determination as to whether 8(a) contracts are
overpriced ,
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis presents an analysis of maintenance service
contracts awarded by tlie Western Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, San Bruno, California, local
Of f icer-in-Charge of Construction (CICC) field offices. The
contracts analyzed are composed of 8(a) awards and formally
advertised small business awards. The emphasis was on
determining whether overpricing occurs on 8(a) awarded
maintenance service contracts. The determination was m.ade by
comparing the contract change order rates, for both 8(a) and
formally advertised maintenance service contracts.
Researcn for this thesis included (1) a review of applicable
literature, and (2) collection of contract data from officials at
the Small Business Association Regional Office in San Francisco,
VJESTDIV personnel (contract specialists) at various field
9
offices, and the V/ESTDIV Sniall Business Specialist. Contract
data were extracted froiT; the 'JESTDIV Construction Management
System Report (CMS) dated 30 April 1986. 8(a) contracts on tne
CMS were iaentified by a contract number listing provided oy the
WESTDIV Small Business Specialist. Contract change order data




Chapter II provides an overview of the 8(a) Program. The
overview covers the Program^s history and the steps involved in
the contracting process for the procuring agency, SEA, and 8(a)
contractor. The purpose and use of business development funds
are exauiined along with the means of determining the fair market
value and the negotiation process. The chapter concludes with
exaiaples of overpriced 8(a) contracts cited in GAO and United
States Army Audit Agency reports.
Chapter III provides an overview of maintenance service
contracts, their use, and contract administration
procedures. The method of data collection for V/ESTDIV awarded
maintenance service contracts is also presented. The chapter
concludes with an overview of the analytical computations used
for the data collected.
Chapter IV discusses the results of tne analysis. Chapter V
summarizes findings of the analysis and presents conclusions of
the thesis.
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II. OVERVIEU OF THE 3Ca) PROGRAM
A. HISTORY
SBA has had the 8(a) procurement authority since the passage
of the Small Business Act in 1958, But tnis authority was not
used until after the 196? civil disturbances, v;hen SBA offeree
noncompetitive contracts to any small ousiness that agreed to
locate in depressed areas and hire the unemployed and
underemployed in 1968. This test program was not successful
because only a few small businesses were willing to relocate. In
1969, SBA changed the Program^s focus to channel non-competitive
contracts to disadvantaged small businesses. Then in 1978 Public
Law 95-507 defined the purpose of section 8(a) as noted in
Chapter I. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-5]
B. THE 8(a) CONTRACTING PROCESS
The following overview describes the 8(a) contracting
process, along with the responsibilities of the SBA, procuring
agency, and 8(a) contractor. It is provided as background for
understanding how the ultimate contract price is achieved.
The contracting process starts when the SBA and the procuring
agency match the agencies' contract requirements with the
capabilities of an eligible contractor. V/hen a match is made,
the SBA will request the procuring agency to support the 8(a)
contractor's business plan via a request for commitment letter.
The business plan details the business development objectives of
11
tiie contractor, and wnat, how, ana where tne resources will oe
obtained to enable the contractor to increase its ability to
participate in the open market place. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
The procuring agency then reviews the commitment letter, and
when satisfied that tiie contract requirement can be met the
agency notifies the SBA of its intent to contract. The procuring
agency then provides the SBA with contract information (e.g., the
contract plans, specifications, detailed federal government cost
estimate), and any other available information concerning the
contract. [Ref. 4:pp. 19-21]
The SBA then forwards the contract information
(excluding tne federal government cost estimate) to the selected
8(a) contractor via a request for proposal. This document
requires the contractor to submit their detailed estimate for
performing the contract to SBA.
Upon receipt and review of the contractor's proposal SBA
makes a determination as to whether the price proposed is
reasonable by comparing it to the estimated current fair market
price prepared by the procuring agency. If the contractor's
proposal is considered adequate, SBA will forward it to the
procuring agency. If the procuring agency accepts the proposal
as submitted, a contract would be awarded. If the agency does
not accept the proposal, sole source negotiations would be
utilized to achieve the contract price.
The sole source negotiations would be between the procuring
agency and the SBA (tne contractor would be represented by the
12
SBA, who IS the prime contractor). Direct negotiation can be
conducted between the 8(a) contract,or and the procuring agency if
authorized by the SBA. This normally occurs when there is a
limited amount of time and when the 8(a) contractor has had
previous experience negotiating with the procuring agency.
[Fief. 3:p. 1191
Negotiations would conclude with one of tnree possible
outcomes. The first is an awarded contract based on an agreement
of the current fair market price. The second is an awarded
contract that utilized SBA business development expense funds.
The business development expense funds would pay for a price
differential that existed betv^een the procuring agency's
determination of the current fair market value for the contract
ana the price SBA felt was needed to provide the 8(a) contractor
a reasonable profit. The third outcome would be no contract
awara. This would occur when SBA would either not provide
business development expense funds, or reduce the contract price
to tlie fair market price as established by the procuring agency
during the negotiation process.
C. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXPENSE FUNDS
As noted in the preceeding section, the SBA can use business
aevelopment expense funds to fund the difference between the
price negotiated for the 8(a) contract and the price needed for
the 8(a) contractor to earn a reasonable profit. This section
will provide amplifying information as to what business
13
aeveicpraent expense funds are, wtiaL triey can be used for, and now
overpricing can occur if they are not provided.
The 8(a) Program is a business deveiopi.ien t program. Inherent
in a business development program are development related
expenses (e.g., the purchasing of capital equipment) and adequate
credit ana capital. When these expenses are incurred by the 8(a)
contractors, it can result in their contract price being higher
than other established competitors in the market. The higher
price they charge may make them noncompetitive. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
To counter this problem the SBA has a business loan and
investment fund, appropriated by Congress, which provides funds
to compensate for tne development expenses incurred by the 8(a)
contractors. Thus tne SBA can provide business development
expense funds to the procuring agencies to fund the difference
between the negotiated fair market value the agency should pay
and the amount necessary for the 8(a) contractor to earn a
reasonable profit.
Business development expense funds can be used for the
following: [Ref. 3:p. l^U
1. Acquisition of special tooling and test equipment.
2. Facility and production engineering.
3. Training costs to counteract low labor productivity.
4. Labor costs.
5 . M aterial wastage costs.




7. Differential due to low order purcnasing power
and/or material usage in coraparison to competitors.
Overpricing occurs when the procuring agency awards a
contract above the current fair market value, and the price
differential is not funded with SBA business development expense
funds. Overpricing is a violation of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). The FAR coes not allow procuring agencies to
award an 3(a) contract unless eitner the total contract price is
reduced to the negotiated fair market value or business
development expense funds are provided by the SBA for the price
differential. [Ref. 4:pp. 19-21]
D. DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE
Determination of the fair market value for 8(a)
contracts is a unique process for a procuring agency. Normally
the agency estimates the fair and reasonable price for a
contract. For 8(a) contracts the agency must determine the
current fair market value which represents the price that would
be ootained under normal competitive procedures. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
Overpricing of an 8(a) contract can result if a poor estimate
of fair market value is prepared, because the ultimate contract
price is attained via sole source negotiations. During tnese
negotiations the estimate functions as the base from which the
procuring agency determines its ultimate price. The estimate is
also reviewed by the SBA at the time they review and assist the
15
8(a) contr£ct.or vjith his proposal prior to ne^otiaLions
,
so the
estimate can also function as a base for the SBA.
The determination of the fair market price for
maintenance service contracts is aided by the fact that the work
is repetitive and a requirement for most government agencies
(i.e., janitorial ana trash removal). The repetition and
cotamonality of the requirenient provide a good data base for
determining the fair market value. A comparable contract could
be obtained, and with appropriate adjustments for differences in
the contract plans, specifications, quantities, schedules and
wage rates, a good estimate of fair market value could be
developed
.
This issue of repetition and commonality was noted by GAO.
GAO found the fewest problems with fair market value price
determinations when the contract items were repetitively
purchased and also competitively procured from non-8(a) firnis,
[Ref. 6:p. 10]
E. CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
The 8(a) Program uses sole source negotiations to determine
the contract price when a difference exists between the procuring
agency's estimate of the current fair market value and the o(a)
contractor's proposal. As previously noted, the negotiations
will be between the SBA and the procuring agency, or direct
negotiations may be conducted between the procuring agency and
the 8(a) contractor. If the parties pursue negotiations to
16
aeterr.iine the contract price, tuey will enter those negotiations
Vyfith different objectives.
The procuring agency's ultimate t^oal is a contract price that
is equal to or less than their estimate of tne current fair
market value. During negotiations they woula revise their
estimate as necessary, if warranted by additional information
obtained during the negotiation process.
The SBA^s ultimate goal is to obtain a price that v/ould allow
the 6(a) contractor to perform the contract work plus a
reasonable profit. If the price proposed by the procuring agency
is not considered enough to provide a reasonable profit for the
8(a) contractor, the SBA will attempt to conduct further
negotiations to ootain the necessary price. [Ref. 3:p. 119]
These different negotiation objectives can result in two
government agencies pursuing a different contract price. The
procuring agency pursues the current fair market value or less;
the SBA pursues a contract price to perform the contract work
plus a reasonable profit.
F. OVERPRICING SITUATIONS
Overpriced contracts have been cited in audits of DOD
procuring agencies by GAO and the United States Army Audit
Agency. Factors contributing to overpricing were poor estimates
of the current fair market value, nonuse of SBA business
development expense funds when warranted, and opposing
negotiation objectives for the procuring agency and tne SBA.
Specific examples of overpricing cited by these agencies follow.
17
1 . GAP Findin:, s
The Report to the Congress entitled Proposals for
Minimizing tne Ir.ipact of the S(a) Prograr.i on Defense Procurement
^
datea 12 October 1982, had as one of its objectives the
determination of whether DOD procuring agencies acquired goods
and services at fair market prices through the 8(a) Program [Ref.
6:p.51]. The report included eight procurement installations
(two each from the Army, iJavy, Air Force and Defense Logistics
Agency) which were considered to be among tne most active DOD
procuring agencies. These eight installations, which accounted
for 50S of total DOD 8(a) contracts ($466,242,000 out of a total
of $927,898,000), were: [Ref. 6:p. 6]
1. USA Armament Material Readiness Command (ARRCOM)
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.
2. United States Army Missile Command (MICOM)
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
3. United States Navy Ships Parts Control Center
Hechanicsourg , Pennsylvania.
4. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Northern and
Chesapeake Division) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and
Washington, D.C.
5. Warner Robins Air Logistics Center
Robins AFB, Georgia.
6. San Antonio Air Logistics Center and San Antonio
Contracting Center, Kelly AFB, Texas.
7. Defense Fuel Supply Center
Alexandria, Virginia.
8. Defense Personnel Support Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
A total of 113 8(a) contracts were reviewed. These
contracts represent 46:J of the total dollar amount of 8(a)
18
con Lr acts I'cr tiie ei_^nt installations. l^he specific contracts
reviewea for each installaLion were oased on ini^h dollar values
vjithin tnree categories: (1) contracts tnat contain business
deveiopr.ient expense funds, (2) those tnat did not contain tae
funus, and (3) terminated contracts. [F.ef. 6:p. 6]
The report citea the following examples of overpricing
that were attriouted to the poor estiinate of tne fair market
value, nonuse of ousiness development expense funds, and the
difference in the contract price objective during the negotiation
process between the procuring agency and the SBA.
ARRCOM av;arded an 8(a) contract for spare barrel covers
for machine guns for v^l,435 in September 1979. The auditors
found a projien: with the way ARRCOM developed the fair market
value estimate for the contract. ARRCOM computed the estii..ate by
adjustin- for inflation the previous year's non-8(a) awarded
contract, which haa the sar.ie specifications and comparable
contract teri.is. Then an acditional 10 percent was added to tne
total estimate for 8(a) contractor inefficiencies. GAO concluded
that the 10 percent adjustment, which totalled S3, 762, resulted
in ARRCOM suosidizing the 8(a) contractor. Tne $3,762 should
have been fundea with tne SBA's business development expense
funds. [Ref. 6:pp. 11-12]
MICOM awarded an 3(a) contract for missile systeir. repair
parts for $261,785. This price was $7^,840 higner than MICOil's
initial fair iiiarket value estimate which was based on recent
comparable awards. HICOM adjusted their initial estimate lo
19
compensate for 3(a) conLracLor minirnur.) buy/dollar requ irer.ients
for neeaea items. GAO concluded tnat the $7^,840 increase should
have beer, funded witn the SBA's business developraent expense
funds. [Ref. 6:pp. 12-131
ARRCOM awarded eight out of the eighteen 8(a) contracts
reviewed at prices higher than the fair market value. Tnis
occurred because ARRCOM substituted negotiated SBA prices for the
fair r.iarket value estimates which were based on historical data
from non 8(a) contracts. ARRCOM made the substitution because
the SBA did not have business development expense funds or
refused to pay any price differential. [Ref. 6:p. 14]
ARRCOM awarded an 8(a) contract for five million tape
stiffener assemblies for $314,000 (unit cost $0.0628).
This cost was $49,000 higher than the fair market value estimate
prepared by ARRCOM which was based on a unit price of $0.0530,
for a total amount of $265,000. The $0.0530 unit price,
considered to be the current fair market value, was based on
recent (the previous month) awards and offers. The auditors
attributed the ultimate unit price increase ($0.0530 to $0.0628)
to pressure from the SBA negotiator. The SBA negotiator's
Objective was to obtain an award amount that would provide a
reasonable profit for the 8(a) contractor rather than the current
fair market value. [Ref. 6:pp. 15-16]
2. United States Armv Audit Aeencv Findings
An audit of Letterhenny Army Depot, Chambers-
burg, Pennsylvania found that the S(a) janitorial contract award
20
price of $1,022,557 for FY 80 iviay iiave been overpriced. Tnis
determination v;as based on prior contract prices for janitorial
work which were $784,260 for FY 79 (awarded to tne same 8(a)
contractor) and $560,771 in FY 78 (awarded via fornal
advertising). The federal government estimate of the fair market
value for FY 80 was approximately $800,000. Unit costs for
twelve of the supply items in the contractor's proposal were also
reviewed. Of the twelve items, ten were found to be nigher than
General Services Administration prices. There were some changes
in the services specified, but those changes were not
significant and did not justify the price differential. Elements
contriouting to the over'pricing situation were a short time
period before the service was needed and the contracting
officer's failure to consider the federal government estimate and
prior yearns prices and negotiations with the 8(a) contractor.
[Ref. 7:pp. 14-17]
An audit of United States Army Armament Research and
Development Command, Dover, New Jersey found overpricing on three
of the six 8(a) contracts reviewed. The contracts were composed
of one construction and five janitorial services contracts with a
total cost of $2,8 million. The three contracts totalled
$619,993 which was about $78,000 higher than the total fair
market value for those contracts. The three contracts were
awarded at prices based on the contractors' final offers rather
than on the fair market values. S5A business development expense
funds were not sought to fund the difference between the fair
21
market price anc tne contractor's final offer.
[Ref. 3;pp. 15-17]
An audit of ttie Presidio of San Francisco, California
found two 8(a) service contracts totalling about $883,000 that
could have been obtained at a lower price if they liad been
formally advertised. The auditor's analysis was based on the
comparison of one of the 8(a) contracts and a comparable formally
advertised contract. The monthly square foot unit cost was 14
cents for the 8(a) contract compared to 4 cents for the formally
advertised contract. This represents a total annual price
differential of $158,000 for the one 8(a) contract. The auditors
were unable to make a comparison of the second 8(a) contract, but
assumed a similar cost reduction could be expected.
[Ref. 9:p. 4]
An audit of the United States Army Training Center, Fort
Jackson, South Carolina found overpricing associated with two
8(a) awarded janitorial services contracts. The two contracts
were awarded to the same 8(a) contractor for a total of $924,808.
The previous yearns contracts were formally advertised and
awarded for a total price of $477,474. There were minor changes
in the specifications between the two years, but the changes did
not justify the large increase. The overpricing was attributed
to a short time requirement and a poor government estimate of the
fair market value. [Ref. 9:pp. 7-91
An audit of the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord,
California found the 8(a) awarded dining attendant contract to be
22
overpricea by about $912,000. The contract v.'as awarded for about
$2.6 million in FY 8l. The cos t-per-rr;eal price was 69 cents
wnile tne cost-per-faeal price for a coruparable formally
advertised contract v;as ^5 cents. The estimated overpricing, cost
of $912,000 was computed by taking tne cost-per-meal price
difference times the estimated number of meals. The auditors
concluded the overpricing occurred because the procuring officer
did not effectively use the government estimate during
negotiations. [Ref. 10:pp. 5-8]
An audit of the United States Army Missile Command,
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama concludec that the command did not
adequately determine the fair market value for 8(a) awarded
contracts or pursue SBA business development expense funds. The
auditors estimated the additional contract costs incurred as a
result of these inadequacies could exceed $7 million for 35 of
the 38 contract actions (contract award or modification) they
reviewed. The 38 contract actions totaled about $73.2 million
and consisted of 13 contract awards and 25 modifications.
[Ref. ll:pp. 5-9]
An audit of the III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas concluded
that two of the three 8(a) contracts reviewed were overpriced.
The contracts' annual costs were about $6.2 million and were for
janitorial, food and landscaping services. The overpricing
amounted to about $168,000. Overpricing occurred because the
contracts were av/arded at amounts higher than tlie fair market
23
values, and ousiness aevelopr.ient expense funds were not providea
by the SBA for the difference. [Ref. 12:p. 231
G. SUMMARY
Section o(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to
contract on a sole source basis with other federal government
procuring agencies and then subcontract the work to participating
8(a) contractors. The 8(a) contractors are small businesses
owned and controllea by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals. This chapter provided a brief overview of the 8(a)
contract award process, and discussed GAO and Army audit findings
of overpricing.
Overpricing occurs on an 8(a) awarded contract when an award
is m.ade above the fair market value (which represents the price
that would be obtained under normal competitive procedures) and





Overpricing can and does occur, as demonstrated by audits
conducted by GAO and the United States Army Audit Agency of
contracts awarded under the 8(a) Program. The overpricing
examples noted by auditors were attributed to contract processes
inherent to 8(a) contracts, such as the determination of the fair
market value, opposing negotiation objectives for the procuring




A. MAIMTEIJANCE SERVICE CONTRACTS
Maintenance service contracts were selected for the analysis
of tr.is thesis because tney are not as coiriplex as other types of
contracts, tnus making it easier to compare contract prices. Tne
typical maintenance service contract utilizes unskilled labor ana
requires limited capital investment. The services performed are
generally repetitive and a common requirement at most DOD
installations. The combination of these cnarac ter ist ics makes an
analysis of comparable contracts at different installations
i; o s s i b 1 e .
Maintenance service contracts represent all facilities
support contr'acts that do not involve construction. The contract
basically requires a contractor's time and effort and involves a
service rather than an end product. Examples of this type of
contract are janitorial services, automotive and repair services,
grounds maintenance, guard service, and food service contracts.
The contracts are subject to the Service Contract Act, which
requires the contractor to pay the prevailing minimum wage and
fringe benefits as determined by the Department of Labor.
[Ref. 13:pp. 9.1-9.2]
The maintenance service contract typically includes a clause
that permits the federal government to extend the term of the
25
contract. Tne :.iaximuni term for the contracts used in the
analysis for this thesis is 36 montlis (a base year and two option
years )
.
IVhen an option extending the contract period is
executed, a price adjustment to the oase is allowea only for
changes that have occurred in tne prevailing wage rates. Options
are executed by a change order to the contract. A change oraer
is also used to correct specification errors/oi.iissions and
customer requests for revisions to existing services that are in
the scope of the contract. These change orders are negotiated




The data for the research were collected from UESTDIV and
its field activities. The field activities are comprised of
approximately 20 geographically remote offices that service
commands in nine western states and Alaska. The offices are
headed by an Of f icer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC^s). The
Dice is a Navy Civil Engineering Corps Officer who is delegated
contracting authority from the Commanding Officer of UESTDIV.
The data for the maintenance service contracts used for
tnis thesis were extracted from the WESTDIV Status of Contracts
Report (R26), which is a component of the Construction Management
System (CMS). The CMS is a subsystem contained in the
AMALGAMAN/INTEGRATED Disbursing and Accounting Data Base Master
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Kiaintained oy the Naval Facilities Support Office. The C;-iS
provides program, project, and construction managers at the Naval
Facilities Engineering Coi.imand Headquarters, the Engineering
Field Division, and OICC fielc offices with information that
enables them to plan, monitor, and control the acquisition
process. Tne V/ESTDIV R26 Report provides the contract number,
type of contract (i.e., construction, demolition, maintenance
service), location, and current price. The current price
consists of the initial award plus all confirmed change orders.
Telephone interviews were conducted with the cognizant
OICC field offices to obtain a subdivision of the current
contract price. This subdivision consists of the award amount,
total option year change order amount, non-option change order
amounts, and the completion amount. As noted in Section A of
this chapter, maintenance service contract award periods can
total 36 months (a base year and two option years). Options
extensions are consummated via cnange orders. The subdivision
of current price into award amount, option year amount, and
change order ariiounts permitted an analysis of total change order
amounts exclusive of option extension change order amounts.
The V^ESTDIV Small Business Representative provided a
listing of the contract numbers for 8(a) awarded contracts for FY
80 through FY 35. This listing was applied to tne selected
contracts to identify the ones awarded under the 8(a) Program.
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2 . Data Set Definiuion
Maintenance service contracts cover a wide range of base
support functions. To improve contract comparao ili ty only
janitorial, grounas maintenance, refuse disposal, and guard
service contracts were included in this study. These types of
contracts are considered to be representative of repetitive
services required by most commands.
All selected contracts were "closed out", or were to be
completed, by 30 September 1986. This ensured that the reflected
change oraer total cost was a final static figure as opposed to
that of an active contract whose total cost would be dynamic.
The change order total figure represents all executed
changes exclusive of option extensions for each contract in the
data base. Wo attempt was made to differentiate between types of
change orders (i.e., error or omission/customer request).
The UESTDIV H26 Report dated 30 April 1986 was utilized
to obtain the analyzed contracts. A total of 1M7 contracts were
initially selected for the data base. Of those selected, 54 were
5(a) awards ana 93 were awarded via formal advertising. This
initial sample of 147 was reduced as a result of additional
information obtained during the telephone interviews with the
cognizant field offices. This information indicated that: (1)
some contracts were extended beyond the 30 September 1986
contract completion date; (2) some contracts remained active
because of contractor claims; (3) older contracts which had been
completea for more than one year haa been forwarded to central
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storage faciii^ies, !,:aking the retrieval of data cost
prohibitive; and (4) other contracts were corapleted early via a
deductive change order because of contractor poor performance.
The revised contract data base totaled 52
contracts. This base was composed of 20 8(a) av;ards and 32
awarded via forn.al advertising. Appendix A provides a sumr.iary of
contract award, option, change order, and conipletion araounts
along with the total contracts in each category.
C. ANALYTICAL COMPUTATIONS
A change order rate for each contract was computed by
dividing the change order amount by the completion amount and
multiplying the result by 100. The mean, variance, and stanaard
deviation of tne change order rate was computed for the two
categories of contracts (8(a) and formally advertised). The sai.^e
computations were made for each of the four types of contracts
witnin the two categories (janitorial, grounds maintenance,
refuse, guard service). Appendix B provides a summary of the
resul ts .
A two sample t test was used to compare the means of cnange
order rates. [Ref. 14:p. 297] Two tests were made. The first
test compared the mean change order rate for the two categories
of contracts. The second test compared the raean change order
rate for Lhe 8(a) and formally advertised janitorial contracts.
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D. SUMMARY
Maintenance service contracts were selected for tne analysis
of this tnesis because tney are not as coi.iplex as other types of
contracts, thus making it easier to compare contract results. To
improve contract comparability only janitorial, g^rounds
maintenance, refuse disposal, and guard service contracts were
used in this study. All selected contracts were "closed out", or
were completed by 30 September 1986.
The data for the maintenance service contracts were extracted
from tne VJESTDIV Status of Contracts Report. Telephone
interviews were conducted with the cognizant OICC field offices
to obtain the contract award, option, change order and completion
amounts
.
A change order rate for each contract was computed. The
mean, variance and standard deviation of the change order rate
were tnen computed. A two sample t test was then usee to compare
the mean change order rates for the 8(a) and formally advertised
contracts .
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The objective of this tnesis is to review potential
overpricing oT 8(a) contracts from a cnange order cost
perspective. This perspective will take into account the two
different contract processes for o(a) and formally advertised
contracts.
Theoretically, formally advertised contracts are more likely
to experience lower award amounts and a potential for high change
order costs, while 8(a) awards are more likely to experience a
higher award amount and minimal change orders. Therefore,
comparing award prices, as the GAO and Army audits did, may not
give a fair representation of the overpricing phenomenon.
An analysis of total change order cost rates for the two
types of contracts should neutralize the different effects
associated with the different contract processes. This
neutralization should permit a better determination as to whether
8(a) contracts are overpriced since it compares completed
contract costs.
The two sample t test was employed to make an inference about
the population mean change order rates for 8(a) ana formally
advertised contracts. The null hypotnesis was that the
difference between the two population means equaled zero. The
research hypothesis was that tne difference between the
population means for the formally advertised contracts and tne
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3(a) awarded contracts was less than zero. The rejection region
v;as z less tiian t alpha with alpna equalling .10.
To perform the two san.ple t test the sample n:ean, standara
aeviation, and var'iance were computed. The computations were
made for the respective contract totals in the 8(a) and formally
advertised categories. These computations were also made for tne
individual contract types within the two contract categories.
Appendix 3 summarizes the results.
Due to the reduction in the number of contracts analyzed (147
to 52 and the dispersion of the data collected), two separate t
tests were computed vice five as originally planned. The first
compared the mean change order rate for 8(a) and formally
advertised janitorial contracts. The second compared the mean
change order rates for the respective totals in the 8(a) and
formally advertised contract categories.
The mean change order rate for the formally advertised
janitorial contracts was greater than the mean change order rate
for S(a) janitorial contracts, 15.96/i versus 13.90yi. The total
mean change order rate for all contracts in the formally
advertised contract category was also greater than the total mean
change order rate for all contracts in the 8(a) contract
category, 16.13% versus 11.43%. Although the rates differed, the
difference was not great enough to reject the null hypotnesis for
either t test.
The first test resulted in acceptance of the null hypothesis.
The t value was -0.2951 and the t alpha value for .10 was -1.315.
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The rejection revision v/as t less tnan ne,i,ative t alpna. Tnis
indicates conclusively that the difference between the tvyo
population mean cnange order rates is zero for the janitorial
contracts.
The second test also resulted in the acceptance of the null
hypothesis. The t value was -0.9955 and the t alpha value for
.10 was -1.2995. Tne rejection region was t less tiian negative t
alpha. This too indicates conclusively that the difference
between the respective population mean change order rates is zero
for total 8 (a) and formally advertised contracts.
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V. SUMMARY
Overpric ing of 8(a) contracts v;as cited by GAO ana United
States Army Audit Agency auait reports. Overpricing occurs v;hen
tnese contracts are awarded above tne fair market value and SBA
does not provide business development expense funds.
This thesis reviewed overpricing of 8(a) contracts from a
change order cost perspective. An analysis of total change order
costs for 8(a) and forRially advertised contracts should
neutralize the different effects associated with the different
contract processes (8(a) contracts utilize sole source
negotiations while formally advertised contracts utilize open
competition )
.
The analysis was conducted by using tv;o sample t tests to
make inferences about the population mean change order rates.
Two tests were performed. Both test results concluded that tne
mean change order ra'ces for S(a) and formally advertised
contracts are equal. This infers that, on the average, 8(a) and
formally advertised contracts experience comparable change order
rates .
Comparable change order rates conflict with the
tneoretical contract results for o(a) versus formally advertised
contracts. The competition inherent with formally advertised
contracts should result in lower award amounts and a higher
change order rate. The higher change order rate occurs because
the contract parties are not permitted to discuss and resolve
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contract require n:ents prior lo avyaro. Opposite resuito ohouid
occur for 3(a) contracts. For 8(a) contracts tne lack of
cornpeuition should result in a higher aware. Trie sole source
negotiations should result in a better mutual understana ing of
contract requirements and thus minimal cnange orders.
Since change order rates were founa to oe comparable, it can
be concluded that a comparison of award prices, (as the GAO and
Army audits did) provides a fair representation of overpricing
for maintenance service contracts.
35
APPENDIX: A






1. 934,723 1,355,718 443,353 2,733,799
2. 1,599,966 2,692,166 363,777 4,655,909
3. 2,137,416 4,501,860 27,949 6,667,225
4. 100,530 272,131 -0- 372,661
5. 61,675 61,235 13,704 136,614
6. 162,243 175,763 91,595 429,601
7. 364,683 -0- 45,412 410,094
8. 691,244 -0- 329,068 1,020,312
9. 121,094 281,697 52,624 392,415
10. 813,444 -0- 94,503 907,947
11. 163,421 370,144 207,699 741,264
12. 703,000 1,596,235 431,457 2,730,742
GROUNDS
MAINTENANCE
1. 1,118,381 2,221,277 405,274 3,744,932
2. 491,481 512,971 34,084 1,038,536
3. 160,436 176,374 72,034 408,844
REFUSE
1. 98,855 98,855 -0- 197,710
GUARD
SERVICE
1. 585,039 1,291,510 28,848 1,905,397
2. 448,000 255,000 122,019 825,019
3. 352,600 274,450 99,404 726,454
4. 483,321 966,641 1,202 1,451,164
TOTAL CONTRACTS 20
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APPEilDIX A (cont. )
FORMALLY ADVERTISED
CHANGE
AWARD OPTION ORDER CO.MPLETION
JAillTORlAL
i. 1 ,360,249 3,360,166 120,563 4,340,978
2. 43,908 58,682 8,227 110,817
3. 42,000 86,538 227 128,765
4. 168,820 415,769 110,928 659,517
5. 17,352 55,874 16,323 89,549
6. 154,332 183,383 27,492 365,207
7. 117,600 244,476 -0- 362,076
8. 173,000 322,666 -0- 495,666
9. ^69,666 408,938 93,681 872,285
10. 163,729 190,453 5,563 359,745
11. 53,425 -0- 14,343 67,768
12. 317,499 -0- 24,160 351,659
13. 21,627 -0- 158,471 180,098
14. 203,128 253,723 41,137 497,988
15. 317,560 -0- 295,873 613,433
16. 570,402 1,213,711 312,861 2,096,974
GROUNDS
HAINTE NANCE
1. 465,000 983,075 75,545 1,523,620
2. 491,499 180,774 122,874 795,147
3. 480,673 250,133 615,112 1,345,918
4. 218,643 -0- 39,555 258,198
5. 437,000 539,555 161,068 1,137,623
6. 224,950 752,533 15,513 992,996
7. 234,000 571,357 358,919 1,164,276
REFUSE
1. 544,999 727,766 -0- 1,272,765
2. 56,767 116,768 -0- 173,535
3. 150,000 310,096 -0- 460,096
4. 98,928 98,928 -0- 197,856
5. 454,080 908,160 502,077 1,864,317
6. 127,200 127,200 101,200 355,600
7. 215,744 219,008 138,127 572,879
GUARD
SERVICE
26,640 26,640 -0- 53,280




CONTRACT CHANGE ORDER RATES
32 FORMALLY ADVERTISED
GROUNDS GUARD
JANITORIAL MAINTENANCE REFUSE SERVICE
1. 2.49 4.96
2. 7.42 15.45 53.19
3. 0.18 45.70
4. 16.82 15.32 C
5. 16.23 14.16 26.93
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